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Abstract: This paper explores the concept of the living-dead trap (LDT), a
pervasive state of entrepreneurship resulting from the decision to persevere in
the operation of a venture in the face of sustained financial underperformance
and personal psychological disutility. Financially underperforming firms can
survive for long periods, usually with injections of sweat equity and debt,
often decimating in the process the capital of their founders and investors as
well as the obligations incurred to employees and other creditors. More specifi-
cally, this paper suggests a personal composite of specific cognitive and affec-
tive processes that leads entrepreneurs to commit to “failing but not failed”
projects. That is, to fall into a trap known as the living-dead trap. We posit the
living-dead phenomenon as a most pervasive state in firm founding drawing on
cognitive and affective perspectives to model the attendant decision-making
processes.
Keywords: living-dead founders, under-performance, perseverance, entrepreneurial
behavior, cognitive perspective, behavioral trap
Introduction
Performance is a central concept in entrepreneurship, strategy and organiza-
tional theory. The vast majority of studies on new venture performance analyze
either success or failure as the relevant distal outcome. Success has usually been
measured by growth (Davidsson, Delmar, and Wiklund 2002; Delmar,
Davidsson, and Gartner 2003), the achievement of an initial public offering
(IPO) (Giot and Schwienbacher 2007; Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan 2009), or
a high-valuation trade sale (Gompers and Lerner 2004). When an investment
perspective is taken, the latter outcomes represent a harvest opportunity for
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investors. Conversely, failure has been associated with voluntary closure, bank-
ruptcy, or a distressed sale (Watson and Everett 1999). This paper is consistent
with other work that examines the effects of failure from the entrepreneur’s
perspective in a manner distinct from strategic and evolutionary perspectives of
failures, enabling the development of theories in realms that include cognition
and emotion (Ucbasaran et al. 2013).
The living-dead trap (LDT) construct is the result of a construct development
process that reconciles various strands in the literature: the aim is a model
which explains one of the most elusive phenomena in entrepreneurship. The
paper positions the trap phenomenon at the center of firm founding. The
original literature strand leveraged by this paper focuses on the empirical
identification of the living dead phenomenon (Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean
1992) that did not addres its causes. The living dead naturally rested on the
investor and, thus, on the shareholder perspective (Friedman 1962). This paper
amends that original perspective. Given its grounding in stakeholder theory
(Freeman 1984), it includes a second stakeholder who serves as both principal
and agent: the entrepreneur. Paradoxically, the founder is both the origin of the
LDT phenomenon and its primary victim. This theoretical puzzle is addressed via
recourse to an emerging and increasingly voluminous literature stream drawing
from psychology: the behavioral perspective (which began with Kahneman and
Tversky 1979).
The cognitive and affective perspectives anchored in behavioral theory,
which did originate with observed decision-making anomalies, are becoming
increasingly relevant in entrepreneurship (e. g., Baron 2004, or Grégoire,
Corbett, and McMullen 2010). What makes the LDT unique is that previously,
behavioral and cognitive science have not been systematically or comprehen-
sively applied to underperforming firm founders who, contrary to normative
rational choice, refuse to terminate their ventures. Parallel to this discourse,
we find robust literature on permanently failing organizations (Meyer and
Zucker 1989), living-dead organizations (Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean 1992),
and under-performing organizations (DeTienne, Shepherd, and DeCastro 2008;
Gimeno et al. 1997). These contributions tacitly approach the LDT but have not
made the step that this paper proposes: the articulation of a discrete explanatory
model around an LDT construct and its attendant taxonomy.
This integrated, controlled, interdisciplinary approach to theory develop-
ment is at the core of this paper and constitutes its principal contribution to the
literature. While this paper is both a natural and critical extension of the existing
literature, it operates at a high integrated level its tenets being falsifiable, thus
opening a variety of avenues for future research, especially of an empirical
nature given the trap’s relevance to practice. The variables of the causal model
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and, specifically, the mediator variables of the cognitive and affective composite
are subjected to both validity testing and measurements of their strength levels
vis-à-vis the dependent LDT variable. Living-dead owners sustaining underper-
forming firms can be found in all industries and business arenas – including
professional businesses, family businesses, small and midsized enterprises
(SMEs), and certainly “lifestyle businesses” (Reynolds and Curtin 2010).
Empirical research has extensively studied new venture performance by exam-
ining the mortality rates of start-ups (Dowell and Swaminathan 2006; Nerkar
and Shane 2003). These studies, grounded primarily in the population ecology
tradition, invariably define start-up failure as the exit from an industry due
either to dissolution or to acquisition. Survival, the negation of failure, is
assumed to proxy success in these studies, as the liabilities of newness are
significant (Stinchcombe 1965). In contrast to these studies implying success as
the opposite of exit, other studies in the entrepreneurship literature have gone a
step further and defined various other success criteria, including IPO (Giot and
Schwienbacher 2007), and high-valuation trade sale (Gompers and Lerner 2004).
Just as population ecology defined success as the opposite of observable exits,
these studies impute failure as the opposite of successful events. Beyond polar-
ized categorizations, sustained underperformance is posited in the paper to be a
discrete state and occupies an important tract of the continuum between the
standard performance outcome extremes.
This reflection raises important questions about the criteria considered to
measure performance. Since entrepreneurship revolves around the discovery
and exploitation of profitable opportunities for private wealth generation, finan-
cial criteria are usually considered the most appropriate measure of venture
performance. Yet beyond objective financial performance, many entrepreneurs
are motivated to start a business on the basis of lifestyle considerations, the
motivation to become one’s own boss (Leung 2002), or other subjective, personal
factors. Empirical evidence indicates that both financial (returns on capital and
higher incomes) and non-financial psychological and lifestyle criteria are
employed by entrepreneurs to assess their business performance, and the latter
have even been deemed to be more important (Walker and Brown 2004).
Defining Performance
The consideration of both financial and personal or emotional criteria is con-
ceptually appropriate in the context of entrepreneurship, because this phenom-
enon is initiated by the relationship between agent (entrepreneur) and structure
(opportunity) as a duality (Shane 2003). Examining the duality between the
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founder and his or her creation has the potential to extend existing theories,
such as those dealing with perseverance and resilience (Ucbasaran et al. 2013),
which is appropriate in the context of LDT behavioral outcomes. A duality, as
opposed to a dualism, presents two constructs that cannot exist, or be understood,
separate from each other (Sarason, Dean, and Dillard 2006). Since entrepreneur-
ship is essentially built on an individual-opportunity nexus, performance must be
assessed in the specific context of a single individual and opportunity – rather
than, say, an industry benchmark, as purported in strategic management.
Empirical evidence for this differentiated approach to performance is provided
by Gimeno et al. (1997), who suggest that entrepreneurs determine the threshold of
performance. This threshold might be a combination of both objective factors
(financial utility) and subjective factors (emotional utility) weighed by the
entrepreneur.
From this foundation, and heeding the call to align the definition of busi-
ness failure with a specific study’s research question (Ucbasaran et al. 2013), we
model entrepreneurial performance on the basis of how one element of the
duality (the firm) affects the decisions and behavior of the other element (the
founder), upon whose opportunity costs we focus. The performance assessment
is conceptualized as three distinct categories, consistent with research that
views the cost of failure not just in financial terms but also in social and
psychological costs (Ucbasaran et al. 2013). Our objective financial assessment
includes (a) the returns on the capital invested criteria (above alternative risk-
weighted uses of capital) usually accrued as annual profits or during an exit
event but also assessable via third party valuation – for instance, during a given
investment round. The second objective financial assessment criteria is (b) the
wage earnings criteria (salary above comparable labor market options for the
founder) accrued to compensate the founder as operator, manager or stable
contributor to the venture. The subjective assessment is (c) the emotional utility
derived from the venture vis-à-vis the emotional utility derived from alternative
income-generating activities (one concern under this scenario is that founders
can earn relative psychological disutility). If we combine the three performance
assessment criteria – that is, the two objective financial utility criteria and the
subjective emotional utility criteria – various venture performance possibilities
emerge. For instance, a venture may offer to the founder a below-market salary,
psychological disutility, and ultimately financial success in the form of high
returns on capital. This is just one of the multiple performance configurations in
the entrepreneurial performance taxonomy that assumes the founder perspec-
tive, none of which falls below the venture viability threshold, which are
described in the three-way assessment performance structure summarized in
Table 1. Many of the possibilities in the taxonomy might constitute consistent
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performance constructs with discrete patterns and thus warrant research atten-
tion. However, the scope of this paper is restricted to the living-dead founder
category.
Defining Living-Dead Entrepreneurs
The original “living-dead” construct takes the investor perspective. The vivid
metaphor is attributed to Franklin “Pitch” Johnson, a noted Silicon Valley
venture capitalist (VC), who coined the term to describe firms that neither
provide stellar returns nor allow a quick write-off of the investments to the VC.
The term first appeared in the literature in Bourgeois and Eisenhardt’s (1987)
in-depth case study detailing the strategic decision-making processes of the top
management team of a “living-dead” firm, which found that the managers are
unable to perform rational and quick analyses. In this situation, even investors
were found unable to extricate themselves from their ventures, as “these are
insufficiently successful to be taken public, but neither are they clear enough
failures to die” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1987, 143).
Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean (1992), in their survey of VC managers, found
“living-dead” firms to be economically self-sustaining albeit unable to achieve
levels of sales, growth and profitability sufficient to produce attractive rates of
return and exit opportunities for their VC investors. In effect, these are margin-
ally performing, not-yet insolvent firms that tend to persist, yet they fail to meet
the expectations of VCs. Although the concept of living dead has traditionally
been used in the context of VC investments to express “side deals,” we employ it
to denote underperforming founders (including both financial and emotional
underperformance dimensions per the taxonomy in Table 1) and hence strug-
gling business ventures in general.
Table 1: Entrepreneurial performance taxonomy for surviving firms.
Capital gain Income Emotional utility Entrepreneur’s state
Y Y Y Happily successful
Y Y N Living successful
Y N Y Happily invested
Y N N Living invested
N Y Y Happily salaried
N Y N Living salaried
N N Y Happily dead
N N N Living dead
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It is of note that the investor and founder perspectives might overlap, and
as in any other principal–agent relationship, tension is to be expected.
Such agency conflict notwithstanding, at times the founder wears the two
hats of manager and significant investor; hence the agent can also be a
principal (seldom the other way around). Nonetheless, we distinguish the
two praxis roles because they lead to distinct theoretical perspectives.
For instance, in Table 1 the entrepreneurial performance structure capturing
the three performance assessment criteria yields the “unhappy success” cate-
gory, which is characterized by positive financial (income and returns) utility
but emotional disutility. From the investor perspective, this outcome would
be considered a clear success, as would the “unhappy investor” founder
category, which represents emotional disutility and negative income for the
salaried founder while managing to yield positive investment returns (e. g., via
an exit).
Given the investor perspective originally informing the original “living
dead” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1987), it isn’t surprising that many VCs toler-
ate, rather than terminate, living-dead investments by irrationally escalating
their commitment and reinvesting in ventures heading for failure due to erro-
neous judgment (Birmingham, Busenitz, and Arthurs 2003). Ventures are not
terminated despite failing to meet their founders’ and investors’ financial expec-
tations, even if they are economically viable (Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean 1992).
From an opportunity cost of capital perspective, better alternative uses of capital
exist. This paper extends the notion of the living dead a step further by introdu-
cing the concept of a LDT, hence introducing the behavioral, theoretical frame-
work anchored in cognition and emotion to attempt to explain the trap
phenomenon. This implies a focus on the entrepreneur’s perspective, who as
the operating free agent is assumed to always be in possession of the option of
quitting the underperforming venture.
Disbanding a venture after a long, or not-so-long, period of underperformance
is the obvious normative action for founders. Bhidé (2000) advises entrepreneurs
to “walk away” from underperforming ventures, because turnaround hopes
related to radical action or an unexpected bonanza seldom materialize. Despite
such advice, we purport that many entrepreneurs at the helm of such ventures
remain committed to their projects and throw good money after bad while carry-
ing on their struggle. Theorists of old, such as Knight (1921, 366), had already
noticed the phenomenon in the early 1900s: “Man may possibly be timid and
critical on first embarking in new venture, but once committed, it seems unques-
tionable that the general rule is to hold on to the last ditch.” We suggest that
founders holding on to the last ditch are akin to free men and women building
their own prison, their very personal LDT.
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Defining the Relevance of the Living-Dead Trap
A better theoretical understanding and a conceptual model of the LDT seem
relevant for the principal stakeholders of the venture, both the entrepreneurs
and the investors, as well as those addressing entrepreneurship as educators or
policy makers. This understanding begins with the empirical evidence of base
failure rates found in the extant literature. A review of both practice and academic
literature yields an approximation to base failure rates contingent on the premise
that failure is equated with non-survival. Expanding on our earlier reference to the
population ecology tradition, empirical studies are pressed for base survival rates
greater than 50% after the first five years of incorporation. With remarkable
consistency across the period from 1977 to 2001, the five-year survival rate for
new firms was, on average, 48–49% (Strangler 2009). Knaup and Piazza’s (2007)
business longevity study noted 44% survival rates through the fourth year,
further decreasing to 31% through the seventh year. Similarly, Bruno,
Leidecker, and Harder (1987) indicated that within the first five years, 54.5% of
new businesses fail; by the end of the tenth year the figure was 81%. More
optimistically, Audretsch, Houweling, and Roy Thurik (1997) recorded survival
rates of 69% after four years and 44% after 10 years. The academic literature is
unequivocal in its assessment that most start-ups end in failure (Headd 2003).
Regarding survival, it cannot be equated with success either, as the living-dead
construct purports and as Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, and Woo (1994, 372) summar-
ize: “The failure rate of new firms is high (Shapero and Giglierano 1982) and many
survivors achieve only marginal performance (Reynolds 1987).”
Surviving founders have a significant probability of becoming living-dead
entrepreneurs, because they do not synchronize the decision to quit with the
chronic and long-drawn underperformance that precedes non-sustainability and
termination and, as a result, commit resources above and well beyond what is
warranted by the objective facts of the venture situation. At this stage, entrepre-
neurs often solicit and invest new financial and other resources into their “one
basket” (the venture), and eventually the consequences of a failure (e. g., a
bankruptcy) become only more dramatic. As entrepreneurs persist with these
ventures, languishing in the twilight zone between improbable success and
delayed failure, they invest additional resources, often in the form of cash
(from family and friends, and possibly “fools”) and sweat equity, because
bank loans and equity investments are difficult to obtain when a business
approaches insolvency (Beaulieu 1996). Such investments can be characterized
as throwing good money after bad. Eventually, the business reaches a point
when a fall in revenues and/or a rise in expenses are of such magnitude that the
firm becomes unsustainable and insolvent and is unable to attract new
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commitments in the form of debt or equity funding, the resources in the foun-
der’s network having been exhausted. Sooner or later, most founders will not be
able to afford the chronic underperformance of their business and they will quit
… much later than they should have, and at a much greater loss than rational
decision-making would have predicted.
By quitting late in the game, not only will entrepreneurs lose a significant
amount of their investment (Bhidé 2000), they will also most likely suffer even
more from the stigma of failure (Sheperd, Wiklund, and Haynie 2009). This points
to emotional disutility, since the daunting task of improving performance in a
distressed business is likely to take a toll on the entrepreneur’s physical and
psychological health (Jamal 1997). The often traumatic and emotional quality of
the venture experience has been amply documented (Cope 2011). And, as if
personality degeneration, loneliness and conflict (e. g., with partners or employees)
are not sufficiently painful, family and social relationships may also suffer (Akande
1994).
The normative implications of research on the LDT are straightforward and
provide entrepreneurs, investors and educators with a valuable framework to
better pinpoint and evaluate the decision to quit an underperforming but viable
business. Since most business ventures fail in the first five years, knowing when
to “pull the plug” might be just as important as seizing an opportunity to set up
a business. In this regard, recent methodologies, such as lean start-up based
upon “fail fast,” might implicitly undermine the assumption of the LDT and
postulate its avoidance. Beyond the normative “what to do,” this contributions
theoretical development perspective focuses on the “how” and “why.”
This article also joins other work on venture survival by implicitly question-
ing the heroic, high-performance associations with venture creation. Moreover,
it suggests a realistic, dynamic, grounded narrative of venture founding and
development that brings to the fore a fuller range of the a priori venture outcome
probability distribution, one that extends well beyond the clear-cut success and
“failure understood as termination” dichotomy. As such, our article comple-
ments the stream of research that highlights how entrepreneurs persevere in the
face of challenges and setbacks (Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza 2007; Sheperd,
Wiklund, and Haynie 2009; van Gelderen 2012). We aim to shed some light on a
neglected dimension of entrepreneurship – perseverance under conditions of
sustained underperformance – and elucidate the cognitive and affective deci-
sion-making processes that mediate the behavior which brings about the non-
discontinuance of underperformance, the LDT. More specifically, we propose a
conceptual framework for LDT, and we present a series of related propositions.
We conceptually define the LDT as a state characterized by sustained under-
performance combined with survival, where founders explicitly or implicitly
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make the decision not to quit. When the decision to persevere is non-explicit it is
de facto, representing a non-decision to continue. Firms in this sub-optimal
underperforming state can persist for long periods of time, often beyond the
original expectations of their founders and investors. Although living-dead
ventures might generate a profit, they are underperforming on all three com-
parative opportunity cost/performance assessment criteria (i. e., capital gain,
income, and emotional utility) outlined earlier (Table 1). Certain factors are
responsible for rendering underperformance increasingly more chronic as time
passes. For example, the entrepreneur might not consider the cash, effort and
time invested in the venture (sweat equity), or the psychological degradation,
when calculating the venture’s return on investment. Hamilton (2000), who is
often cited, finds that after a decade in business, median entrepreneurial earn-
ings are 35% lower than predicted alternative wages (adding nonwage compen-
sation, such as employer-provided health insurance, worsens the comparison for
firm founders, who as a group are not necessarily less talented or lower-ability
workers). In addition, opportunity costs arise, given the difficulty ex-entrepre-
neurs face in re-entering corporate life at levels equivalent to those their career
tracks would have afforded them had they not ventured (Worcester 2001). In
summary, not only is the business venture struggling financially, sustaining
viability while barely making a profit, the entrepreneur also often fails to
achieve his or her personal (subjective) objectives. Moreover, evidence points
to the mortgaging of the entrepreneur’s very future.
Modeling the Living-Dead Trap
Conceptually, the phenomenon of the living dead is linked to the stream of work
on “permanently failing organizations,” which is defined by Meyer and Zucker
(1989, 19) as “organizations whose performance, by any standard, falls short of
expectations, yet whose existence continues,” sometimes over long periods of
time. Van Wittelloostuijn (1998) attributes a firm’s tendency to “keep on ticking”
to institutional factors such as idiosyncrasies and narrow stakeholder interests,
often specific to a given industry, yielding intra-firm conflict that is nearly
impossible to manage. Consequently, underperformance is the “unintended
result of a myriad of practices,” never the result of “deliberate or intentional”
actions of decision makers (Rouleau, Gagnon, and Cloutier 2008, 34). We
propose a perspective that centers on the ultimate decision-maker for the firm,
the entrepreneur, capable in his or her own agency to reach (or terminate) the
state of a “permanently failing organization,” a deliberate result of implicit and
explicit decision-making shaped by cognitive and affective factors.
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Figure 1 (below) models the decision flow leading to the living-dead state of
a permanently failing organization. The mediating variable is a personal cogni-
tive and affective composite that represents the sum of cognitive and affective
forces, compelling a founder with an underperforming yet viable venture either
to quit or to persevere. Maintaining the venture represents a behavior that leads
to the LDT, notwithstanding the small percentage of ventures whose fortunes
will turn around in the most unkind of circumstances (given that the likelihood
of success is very small for new ventures, turnaround probabilities are posited to
be even lower for underperforming ventures). Exiting at a loss, and assuming
the sunk costs, is the normative solution for underperforming ventures.
Proposition 1: The entrepreneur makes the decision to persevere, or the non-
decision not to quit, an underperforming venture and hence falls into the living-
dead trap. Alternatively, he or she makes the decision to terminate the venture.
Either decision occurs via the mediation of a posited, personal, cognitive and
affective composite that captures all of the cognitive and affective vectors which
associate the venture to the founder.
The composite cognitive construct in Figure 1 is a composite of cognitive and
affective forces, leading to the behavior to persevere. While the balance of the
fundamental constituting forces forming the composite (such as irrational esca-
lation of commitment as proposed by Bazerman 2002) causes founders to make
the decision to persevere, the strength of each constituting force and its impact
on decision-making will, of course, vary across individual founders. This cogni-
tive and affective composite construct suggests that cognitive and affective
Under-
performance
Decision on 
venture 
continuation
Cognitive and 
affective 
composite
Living-dead 
trap
Exit at loss
Persevere
Terminate 
Figure 1: Decision-making process leading to the living-dead trap.
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perspectives can provide a useful anchor to explain the LDT, the non-rationality
of throwing good money after bad. For instance, while other factors such as
project and social determinants may explain an escalation of commitment,
Sleesman et al. (2012) noted that psychological determinants represent the
most frequently studied phenomenon in the literature. This latter category
recognizes that “decision makers engage in cognitive and affective processing
of information that often leads them to redouble their commitment to failing
projects, rather than de-escalate” (Sleesman et al. 2012, 544).
The cognitive perspective, which addresses mental representations (expressed
through cognitive maps, perceptions, and schema) and the dynamic interactions
between environment, cognition, and action, has been suggested as adequate for
entrepreneurship research (Grégoire, Corbett, and McMullen 2010). Since the
entrepreneurial process is initiated and implemented by individuals, Baron
(2004) has suggested that the cognitive perspective may shed new light on key
aspects of entrepreneurial behavior (e. g., decision making, problem solving, and
self-regulation of behavior). Indeed, entrepreneurs must resort to cognitive and
affective resources in the process of firm creation as they are faced with uncer-
tainty and business challenges of an unparalleled magnitude, such as the impos-
sibility of calculating a priori potential losses or the unpredictable nature of gains
(Dew et al. 2009). Social cognitive theory (Bandura 1986) suggests that the effects
of personal disposition (such as overconfidence, optimism, persistence or passion)
are often determined by their interaction with important behavioral and environ-
mental factors. Somewhat paradoxically, the very same cognitive and affective
variables, such as optimism, commitment, persistence or deficient affective fore-
casts that are the hallmark of successful entrepreneurs, can also lead to their
demise. In terms of the decision to quit or not to quit when faced with an
underperforming venture, the mediating personal cognitive and affective compo-
site components can be deconstructed or unpacked into critical cognitive and
affective causes such as the endowment effect, sunk cost bias, over-optimism,
over-confidence or the deficient affective forecast. Among myriad possibilities,
there are central factors that lead entrepreneurs to avoid the decision to terminate
in the face of underperformance. At the single LDT entrepreneur level, assuming
that certain causes prove more salient than others, some of the identified factors
will not be prove noteworthy. Additionally, the psychological make-up of the
single entrepreneur might incorporate additional causes. To understand the rela-
tionship between one specific cognitive or affective factor constitutive of the
personal cognitive and affective composite impacting the decision to persevere,
or not to quit, and fall into the LDT, we review these factors, which the extant
literature, as applied to our research question, might suggest to be relevant in the
LDT context.
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Endowment Effect
Anecdotal evidence from entrepreneurs asked to accept regular employment
suggests that a “mild form of hara-kiri” would be preferred over giving up
their business (Ronstadt 1986). Entrepreneurs, therefore, prefer the status quo,
and, as Rouleau, Gagnon, and Cloutier (2008, 33) remarked: “In an organization
stuck somewhere between inertia and performance, a relative no-man’s land will
probably sustain itself until the next crisis.” Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
(2000) suggested that this behavior stems, to a large extent, from the “endow-
ment effect” – a consequence of attachment to a possession.
Possession attachment describes the relationship between an individual and
a specific material object that has been psychologically appropriated, decom-
modified, and singularized through person–object interaction (Schultz-Kleine
and Menzel-Baker 2004). Additionally, owners often regard a possession as
part of themselves and their own identity (Belk 1988). Since the entrepreneur-
venture duality forms the cornerstone of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs often
define themselves in relation to their venture, and they are therefore likely to
show a strong attachment to their venture. For example, many refer to their firm
as “their baby” (Cardon et al. 2005).
An important consequence of the endowment effect is that individuals value
the assets they own more highly than assets not included in their present
ownership. As a result, they will demand a higher selling point for a good
they own than the price they would be willing to pay for the item if they did
not own it and had to purchase it. This is because the seller is taking into
account the potential (emotional) loss they would suffer by selling the good.
Zellweger and Astrachan (2008) demonstrated that for owner-managers, the
minimum acceptable price for the owner-manager consists of an “objective”
price determined by conventional valuation methods and an emotional value.
Entrepreneurs are often oblivious to this bias in the business valuation and have
difficulty finding a buyer who offers the “right” price to close the deal.
Consequently, entrepreneurs become entangled in a LDT because they suffer
from “psychological inertia” (Sandri et al. 2010). In summary, they hold onto a
losing project for much longer than real-options reasoning would predict. The
ensnaring nature of the status quo bias is further defined by Loewenstein and
Adler (2000, 734) as people in general who are “unwittingly trapped by their
choices; they make choices with an unrealistic sense of their reversibility.”
Therefore:
Proposition 2: The endowment effect is positively related to the living-dead
trap.
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Sunk Cost
Entrepreneurs who establish a new venture typically invest considerable personal
resources, time and energy to ensure the venture’s viability. It is therefore not
surprising that they appear reluctant to terminate their business in the light of
concerns that they might be perceived as having wasted these initial resources
(Shepherd et al. 2008). Previous research indicates that initial capital provides the
entrepreneur a buffer to withstand poor performance and liquidity problems
without having to exit the business (Brüderl and Schüssler 1990; Levinthal
1991). However, “it may also suggest that financial investments are largely irre-
versible” (Gimeno et al. 1997, 776). As a result, individuals continue an endeavor
once they have made an investment of money, time and/or energy because to
terminate a course of action would appear wasteful (Arkes and Blumer 1985).
The dilemma is particularly acute when the decision involves whether to
discontinue an unproductive line of behavior or to commit more effort and
resources into ensuring that this course of action pays off. In these circum-
stances, there appears to be a tendency to escalate commitment above and
beyond what the objective facts of the situation warrant (Staw 1981). As entre-
preneurs persist with their ventures, they invest additional cash and sweat
equity because bank loans and equity investments are difficult to obtain when
the business approaches insolvency (Beaulieu 1996). This translates into an
escalation situation, where decision makers continue in their commitment to a
specific course of action despite information suggesting that the course of action
is failing (Staw 1981; Staw and Ross 1987).
The sunk cost trap underpins and is also closely related to the escalation of
commitment, which is prevalent among entrepreneurs because (1) they have feel-
ings of responsibility for the initial decision – once individuals make a decision,
they feel responsible for it, and they view reversing the decision as backing away
from such responsibility; (2) the effort involved in making the start-up decisions
require difficult cognitive work – most people are reluctant to begin the process all
over again; and (3) there exist concerns about the loss of face and image that may
result from admitting that one has made a mistake (Baron 1998). Therefore:
Proposition 3: The sunk cost trap is positively related to the living-dead trap.
Over-optimism
There is substantial evidence in many domains that individuals are optimistic, in
that they have a generalized positive outlook toward the future (Scheier and
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Carver 1985). In terms of firm founding, this has often been perceived as a
condicio sine qua non, or an essential element or condition. Cassar (2010)
found substantial over-optimism in nascent entrepreneurs’ expectations, in
that they overestimate the probability that their nascent activity will result in
an operating venture. Further, for those ventures that achieve operational capa-
city, individuals often overestimate expected future sales employment. Over-
optimism is not always conducive to underperformance nor is it irrational, and it
has sometimes been posited that self-selection based on rational choices can
result in over-optimism among entrepreneurs. For example, founders hold over-
optimistic beliefs simply as a consequence of acting rationally on noisy yet
unbiased signals of returns from vocational activity (Van den Steen 2004).
Overall in practice, optimism has been found to be quite resistant to many de-
biasing interventions, such as making people aware of the risks, changing the
presentation mode of the risks, changing the intensity of the risks, and generating
reasons why these risks might occur (Weinstein and Klein 1995). Consistent with
the idea that the de-biasing of optimists is a difficult task, Åstebro, Jeffrey, and
Adomdza (2007) found that optimistic inventors often pay little attention to advice
that asks them to modify their behavior and stop spending more. Therefore:
Proposition 4: Over-optimism is positively related to the living-dead trap.
Over-confidence
Similarly, individuals generally exhibit overconfidence, in that they overesti-
mate their ability to do well (Larwood and Whittaker 1977). In the field of
entrepreneurship, a stream of research demonstrates that overconfidence is the
cause of “excessive business entry” (Camerer and Lovallo 2000; Wickham 2006).
Such over-confidence may be related to an individual’s knowledge, ability to
predict the future, or general personal abilities (Hayward, Shepherd, and Griffin
2006; Simon and Houghton 2003).
In their study of reinvestment decisions by entrepreneurs, McCarthy,
Schoorman, and Cooper (1993) found that overconfidence is consistently the
strongest predictor of new capital invested. This finding suggests that when
entrepreneurs express a level of confidence that exceeds their own beliefs about
the norms for success, it may be the clearest signal that a significant level of
psychological commitment has been made and that the individual might be at
risk for escalation bias in future decisions. Therefore:
Proposition 5: Over-confidence is positively related to the living-dead trap.
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Deficient Affective Forecast
Many important decisions are based on affective forecasts – people’s predictions
about their future feelings. This factor is important, as it addresses the issue and
the emergence of emotional disutility, which defines the living dead. When
deciding whether to continue running an underperforming firm, entrepreneurs
are likely to consider the intensity and the duration of the pleasure they will
derive from this action. On the positive side, pleasure might also be derived from
the learning opportunity associated with the failed business (McGrath 1999) and
the learning gained in mastering the challenges of keeping the venture afloat.
The affective expectations model indicates that the degree to which a person
believes they will enjoy an experience (affective expectation) is as important as
what actually happens during the experience in determining his or her evalua-
tion of the experience (affective reaction) (Wilson et al. 1989).
To the extent that an entrepreneur has a track record in establishing and
operating an underperforming firm, a reasonable strategy would be to use the
memories of their past effective experiences to predict their future ones. In order
to learn from past experiences, however, entrepreneurs must be able to correctly
recall their previous feelings. Klaaren, Hodges, and Wilson (1994) suggest that there
is often a retrospective bias, whereby people re-interpret aspects of the experience
that were inconsistent with expectations or selectively remember the experience.
There is a great deal of evidence regarding impact bias in making predic-
tions about emotional reactions to future events. For example, college football
fans overestimated the impact of a win by their favorite team (Wilson et al.
2000), and college students overestimated the impact of receiving an unexpect-
edly high or low grade on a test (Buehler and McFarland 2001). The impact has
been found in a variety of populations (e. g., college students, professors, vaca-
tioners, people taking medical tests) experiencing different emotional events
(e. g., romantic breakups, personal insults, sports victories, electoral defeats,
tragic stories; for a review, see Wilson and Gilbert 2003).
We suggest that entrepreneurs with positive expectations are likely to put a
favorable spin on outcomes they receive and the outcomes they expect, even
when existing outcomes might reasonably be considered disappointing, and
future outcomes equally unpromising. As Cooper and Artz (1995, 440) remarked,
those entrepreneurs “who had a positive view of their initial prospects later
viewed the experience of business ownership more favorably, regardless of
subsequent performance.” We therefore posit that:
Proposition 6: A defective affective forecast is positively related to the living-
dead trap.
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One of the recurring points of the above prepositions is that the reviewed
constituent affective and cognitive factors are often conceived as an indispen-
sable condition, for jumping into the ocean and starting one’s venture. As
entrepreneurship’s core, they possess a paradoxical dual role: The very enablers
of entrepreneurship do, in fact, destroy entrepreneurs.
Conclusions
In this paper, we built a conceptual model explaining the living-dead phenom-
enon. Drawing on the cognitive and affective perspectives of this phenomenon,
we identified a personal cognitive and affective composite that mediated
between the founder’s non-performing venture and his or her decision not to
quit – that is, the gateway to the LDT snare.
Contributions
This paper attempts to contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by discern-
ing the LDT phenomenon, which has received relatively scant scholarly atten-
tion to date probably because it is a theoretical anomaly requiring a variety of
literature and theories to discuss and model. There is also the stigma associated
with labels such as “underperformance” or “failure,” with protagonists charac-
terized as “loser entrepreneurs” who cannot even manage to fail properly. In this
paper, we sought to gain a better understanding of the LDT, among other
reasons for failure, because it might be the most relevant state of
entrepreneurship.
The conceptual development of the LDT and its explicative cognitive and
affective composite as a mediating force both qualify and challenge some of the
existing understandings of firm founding. For instance, Gimeno et al.’s (1997)
work on underperformance posits a threshold model – namely, a threshold
internally defined by the firm, below which the owner-managers would dissolve
the firm. Their findings suggest that underperforming firms continue not
because they are irrational or are throwing good money after bad money, but
because their owner-managers are satisfied with a lower return over that which
an alternative investment might provide. The LDT, on the other hand, suggests
that the purported threshold is left unconsidered or that it is dynamic and
mediated by emotions and cognition, the threshold incidentally declining as
the firm ages. Building upon the threshold theory, DeTienne, Shepherd, and
DeCastro (2008) found that entrepreneurs significantly factor in environmental
munificence, personal investment, personal option, and previous organizational
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success when making a decision about persistence with an underperforming
firm. However, one of their most important findings was that there is hetero-
geneity among entrepreneurs in terms of their cognition and extrinsic motiva-
tion, and this heterogeneity can help to explain why firms have different and
dynamic thresholds of performance and why the living dead exist. And yet at the
end of the day, and despite negative financial outcomes associated with delay-
ing business failure, research suggests that entrepreneurs persist over an
extended period of time (Gimeno et al. 1997; Karakaya 2000). This paper extends
a series of theoretical perspectives and findings into the LDT construct, which
then articulate the processes operating at the underperforming founder level.
These processes are conceptualized as a cognitive and affective composite that
functions as the critical mediator variable during the decision to terminate the
non-performing venture.
Implications
The paper’s focus on theoretical development renders it conducive to research
aimed at enriching our theoretical understanding of entrepreneurial behavior.
There exist several research opportunities to further explore the living-dead
phenomenon and its trap. Concepts and methods to detect, avoid and defuse
the LDT should be of interest to practitioners and to entrepreneurship educators
alike. As an example, a measurable benchmark of sustained entrepreneurial
underperformance – akin to a living-dead indicator – could be developed. Such
an indicator would enable the description of living-dead founders in objective,
measurable terms and may eventually lead to the development of an LDT
assessment tool. Further work addressing the impact of individuals’ identifica-
tion with outcomes of entrapment would contribute to the field of entrepreneur-
ship. For example, Brockner et al. (1986) suggested that negative feedback
initially increases task persistence. If, however, individuals continue to receive
negative feedback in spite of increased persistence, then they will begin to
withdraw from, rather than persist in, the task at hand. Here again, we find
derived normative suggestions, including the need to make entrepreneurs cog-
nizant that time and expenses already invested are nothing more than “sunk
costs,” forcing a second, more meditated plunge into the decision-making
process (Bazerman 2002). Despite the discourse about the virtue of passion
and perseverance, it is therefore equally important for entrepreneurs in under-
performing businesses to receive negative feedback and advice about the state of
their projects, as well as about their own cognitive and affective states. By what
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behavioral logic can they be made to recognize early on that they have reached a
dead end when this is, by all benchmarks, the inevitable conclusion?
Another research stream could focus on the criteria and debiasing methods
employed to exit a living-dead situation and to escape the corollary entrapment.
VCs could provide a useful understanding, as well as valuable pointers, in this
field. As we have seen, despite being expert, detached decision-makers, VCs are
also subject to the escalation of commitment (e. g., in the context of staged
funding), and have difficulty taking corrective action even when facing negative
information warranting termination (Birmingham, Busenitz, and Arthurs 2003).
However, by virtue of the fact that VCs are seldom involved in business operations,
they may be less likely to suffer from the cognitive and affective biases discussed.
Their unambiguous mandate is to create value for their investors and to terminate
chronically underperforming ventures. It would be useful to identify the specific
indicators VCs employ to discontinue or refrain from further investment.
Beyond the earlier discussion on threshold theory, existing theories and
concepts could be refined to mitigate the risk to fall into the LDT. For instance,
the regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1998) may serve as a powerful tool in
understanding goal-directed behavior in underperforming firms. The regulatory
focus theory delineates how people engage in self-regulation, or the process of
bringing oneself into alignment with one’s standards and goals. At any given
point in time, people may engage in self-regulation with a promotion focus or a
prevention focus (Brockner, Higgins, and Low 2004). While entrepreneurs main-
tain their struggle in distressed businesses, driven by their own vision, flexibil-
ity, and enthusiasm (a promotion focus), they may lack a prevention focus, and
its attendant constraints, to ensure that they remain in touch with reality. A
strengthening of the prevention focus would increase the inclination for security
and responsibility and may prevent entrepreneurs from falling into the LDT.
Similarly, notions of affordable loss may help entrepreneurs estimate what they
might be able to put at risk and determine what they are willing to lose in order
to persist with an underperforming business. The affordable loss heuristic might
also provide entrepreneurs with the emotional back-up required to quit, and
thus become a factor in the theorized cognitive and affective composite con-
struct when the time arrives (Dew et al. 2009). We expect this paper to encourage
research on how specific affective and cognitive phenomena balance and offset
each other and contribute to the decision to continue or discontinue a venture.
Finally, we believe that ongoing research to test and further refine the LDT
and its operating causal relationship will increase awareness of the LDT, which
is a must in order to make entrepreneurs, investors, and society in general
sensitive to the implications of the self-destructing entrapment in failing pro-
jects, regardless of whether or not they remain viable for the time being. The
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more entrepreneurship is recognized as creating wealth for society as a whole,
the more pressing it becomes to address those tragic prisoners of their own
creation, if only on the grounds of efficiency and ethics. The research agenda
outlined above may play a critical role in achieving a much-needed understand-
ing, and hence awareness, of entrepreneurship’s dark core.
Acknowledgement: The authors appreciate Thierry Voléry’s and Denis A. Grégoire’s
valuable comments on earlier versions of the paper.
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